PAD’s final putsch is the nation’s paradox
Written by Admin on Friday, August 29th, 2008
LET IT BE
PAD’s final putsch is the nation’s paradox
August 26, 2008 was supposed to be the day the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) successfully ousted the government of Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej, and changed the face of Thai politics in a so-called people’s revolt.
Instead, it only raised the level of confrontation to the brink and kept the nation in a paradox.
The PAD struck early morning with an assault on the state-run television station NBT, and later in the afternoon seized Government House, occupying the front lawn. The PAD demonstrated that their rallying cry was effective when tens of thousands showed up at the various points according to plan.
Resistance was minimal, as the government seemed to correctly anticipate the attack moves and motives. An immediate reaction could lead to violence, inflaming the general public and virtually providing additional fuel for the protesters.
The wait was worthwhile. The usually belligerent PM Samak appeared calm late Tuesday afternoon, after a cabinet meeting and a hush-hush session with the top brass on the annual military reshuffle list. The latter one essentially consolidated the PM’s position, so when he held the press conference, he was in control.
Military commanders have signalled “no coup”. The handling of the demonstrators has been left to the police. Law and order must be restored. The government initiated a well-organised public relations campaign which gently nudged back the PAD’s legitimacy and highlighted its illegality and “undemocratic” intentions.
Many of the PAD’s own strategic mistakes led to the undoing of its legitimacy and support.
First, the PAD stepped out of bounds when they trespassed into NBT. Footage showed PAD protesters acting more like terrorists than a peaceful civil disobedience group.
Moreover, NBT, although a government agency, is considered part of the media and thus protected by the constitution under freedom of speech.
By forcing the station to shut down and attempting to uplink it with ASTV, the PAD’s own mouthpiece, the PAD lost credit with mainstream media. Press associations publicly condemned the attack.
Second, past PAD rallies were conducted around protest targets but never breached government property. The seizure of NBT, various ministries and finally Government House not only discredited the PAD in the eyes of law-abiding Thais, but also opened a loophole for the government to claim legitimacy in dispersing the mobs.
An opinion poll showed that around 70% of the public disapproved the hit on NBT and Government House, and 42% supported the arrest of protesters.
Arrest warrants were issued for the leaders of the PAD. The Civil Court ordered the protesters out of Government House premises.
Third, the PAD never really believed that PM Samak, who is democratically elected, would resign in the face of protests. The decision to call for the final putsch was designed to provoke the use of force by authorities, with bloodshed anticipated, hopefully leading to a military coup deposing the government.
What would come in its place is not totally clear - which presents another weak point in the PAD’s argument.
The PAD claimed that citizens have the right to organise and overthrow an unjust government. Many would agree. But by not resorting to democratic solutions, the PAD misjudged public sentiment.
The paradox being that while many Thais, especially the urban middle class, do not trust the ruling People Power party (PPP) and dislike PM Samak, they do not want to go back into the vicious cycle of coup and counter-coup.
The majority of Thais would like to see the country get back on track economically, through democratic means. They realise that democracy, no matter how imperfect, still provides more stability, credibility and legitimacy in doing business with the world. For a nation which depends on exports and tourism for cold hard cash, that rationale is the determining factor for the system of government people prefer.
That the apparent failure of the interim government after the 2006 coup was due to lack of international recognition and support was a lesson well learnt.
It has been more than three years now that Thais have had to live in an atmosphere of political uncertainty. The silent majority is tired, restless and frustrated.
They do not want to take sides and simply just want the conflict to end.
But how does one choose which side is the lesser of two evils?
The PAD’s final putsch only reinforced the perception of chaos and paralysis. Sadly, however, no matter how events unfold this weekend, the confrontation remains and the conflict has deepened. Without a viable democratic alternative, without a third way, Thais are caught in a never-ending paradox.
Suranand Vejjajiva served in the Thaksin Shinawatra cabinet and is now a political analyst.
